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THE BEGINNING OF LIABILITY OF A CARRIER
OF GOODS.
A carrier of goods is a bailee of the goods for the purpose
of carriage; and his responsibility as carrier cannot begin until
he has become a bailee. And since possession of the bailee is the
gist of the bailment, the carrier's responsibility does not begin
until the moment when he assumes possession.
The simplest form of such assumption of possession is the
actual taking of goods into the hands of an authorized agent of the
carrier for carriage. Where this happens, the carrier's respon-
sibility begins from the moment the carrier's agent takes the goods.'
One who delivers goods to a person purporting to act for
a carrier must see to it that the person is actually authorized by
the carrier to accept goods on his behalf; the shipper takes the
risk of the authority of the person with whom he chooses to deal.2
Thus it is not, or may not be, enough to charge the carrier by
coach to show that the goods were handed to the driver ;3 to
charge an express company, to show that the goods were handed
to a clerk in its office;4 or to charge a carrier by water, to show
r. Boehm v. Combe, 2 M. & S. 172; Pickford v. Grand /unction Ry., x2
M. & W. 765; British Columbia S. M. Co. v'. Nettleshi 
, 
L. R. 3 C. P., 499;
Bulkeley v. Naumkeag S. C. Co., 24 How. (U. S.) 386; Green v. Milwau-
kee & S. P. R. R., 4r Ia. 41o; Greenwood v. Cooper, io La. Ann. 796;
Phill: s v. Earle, 8 Pick. (Mass.) x82; Camden &. A. R. R. v. BelknapO, 21
Wend. (N. Y.) 354; East Line &. R. R. Ry. v. Hall, 64 Tex. 6iS.
2. Buckman v. Levi, 3 Camp. 4x4; Missouri Coal Co. v. Hannibal &.
S._. R. R., 35 Mo. 84: Elkins v. Boston & M. R. R., 23 N. H. 275; Butler
v. Hudson River R. R., 3 E. D. Smith IN. Y.) 571.
3. Blanchard v. Isaacs, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 388.
4. Cronkite v. Wells, 32 N. Y. 247.
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that the goods were handed to a person standing on the wharf"
or to a deck-hand or other member of the crew.8 It is how-
ever sufficient to deliver the goods to a servant of the carrier who
is usually employed in receiving and forwarding goods for the
carrier; a shipper has a right to assume that such a person has
ample authority to deal with him in this matter.7
If the carrier consents to send for a parcel at the house of
the shipper, it would seem to be clear that he becomes liable at the
shipper's house, where his servant accepts the parcel. In one case
it was held that the carrier's servant in such a case became the
shipper's agent to ship the parcel at the regular office of the com-
pany, and that the carrier's liability as such began at that point.8
But it was soon after rightly held in such a case that the carrier's
liability began at the shipper's house, where the servant of the
carrier assumed possession.9  So if an express company by its
agent receives goods as they arrive at the freight station of a rail-
road, the express company is liable from that time, though it has
not yet brought the goods to its office.' 0
Upon the same principle, where a carrier by sea, in a harbor
where a vessel cannot reach the wharf to take its cargo, is ac-
customed to send lighters to the wharf to receive the cargo and
bring it to the vessel, the carrier's liability begins as soon as the
goods are received on board the lighter." Where a carrier by
sea was accustomed to receive its cargo while still upon the lighters,
the process being to moor a lighter to the vessel and then take
charge of the lading from the lighter, responsibility of the car-
rier was held to begin as soon as the lighter was moved alongside,
ready to discharge; and a lighter so moored having broken loose,
and its cargo having consequently been damaged, the carrier was
held liable.'
5. Buckman v. Levi 3 Camp. 414.
6. Leirh- v. Smith, i C. & P. 638; Trowbridge v. Chapin, 23 Conn. 595;
Ford v. Mitchell, 21 Ind. 54; Gleason v'. Goodrich Transp. Co., 32 Wis. 85,
14 Am. Rep., 76.
7. The City of Alexandria, 28 Fed. 202;Jordan v. Fall River R. R., 5Cash. (Mass.) 69; Grosvenor v. New York C. R. R., 39 N. Y. 34; Wibeck
v. Schuyler, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 469.
8. Boys v. Pink, 8 C. & P. 429.
9. Davey v. Mason, Car. & M. 45.
zo. Southern .Exp. Co. v. Newby, 36 Ga. 63s.
ii. Bulkeley v. Naumkeag S. C. Co., 24 How. (U. S.) 386; The Bark
Edwin, x Spra. 477; The Oregon, Deady, 379; The City of Alexandria, 28
Fed. 202.
12. Campbell v. The Sunlight, 2 Hughes, 9.
LIABILITY OF A CARRIER.
It sometimes becomes important to determine at what mioment
goods delivered to the carrier by tackling or other mechanical device
pass into the possession of the carrier. Where goods are taken
out of the vehicle in which they are brought to the conveyance
of the carrier, the tackling by which the transfer is effected usually
belongs to, or at least is operated by the carrier; and in that case
the carrier's responsibility begins as soon as the goods are attached
to the tackling.1 3 The leading case was that of a warehouseman
who provided a crane in which goods to be stored were hoisted in-
to the warehouse. A bale had been attached to the crane, but fell
froni it and was injured. Lord Ellenborough held that the pos-
session passed to the warehouseman when the bale was in the
crane, and lifted from the cart; when the warehouseman took them
into his own hands, which was the moment he applied the tackle
to them, his liability began. It was urged that the bate fell be-
cause the slings used were not strong enough, and that the ware-
houseman offered the carman sufficient slings which he declined
to use. But Lord Ellenborough charged that if this was the case
the warehouse man was not excused; he should have insisted on the
use of better slings, or if that was refused he should have declined
to accept the goods."
The determining fact in such a case is the control of the
machinery. "Much will depend upon the manner in which they
receive goods for transportation, the provision they make for
raising heavy articles into their cars, and the active participation
of the agent of the company in reference to the same."15
Where grain or liquid is shipped in bulk, it is usually delivered
through a pipe or chute; and it may be important to determine the
moment during delivery when the liability of the carder begins.
In such a case an elevator was delivering grain to a carrier through
a pipe, the bottom of which was attached to the hatch of the car-
rier's boat; the grain was allowed to drop into the pipe from the
elevator, control over it being exercised by a slide or valve at the
top. The pipe became accidentally loosened from the hatch, and
much grain was spilled into the water. The court held (follow-
ing the doctrine laid down in the case of delivery by a crane) that
the carrier, having control of the mouth of the pipe, was re-
sponsible for the grain.1 6 But it would seem that the same re-
13. The Cordillera, 5 Blatch. 518; Merritt v. Old Colony & N. Ry., Iz
Allen (Mass.) go.
14. Thomas v. Day, 4 Esp. 262.
is. Dewey, J., in Merritt v. Old Colony & V.Ry.,xr Allen (Mass.) 8o, 83.
x6. The R. G. Winslow, 4 Biss. 13, Fed. Cas. No. x1,736.
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sult might be reached on a more general ground. As soon as
goods are allowed to fall freely into a receptacle provided by the
carrier, like coal passing from the mouth of a chute or, in this
case, the grain falling past the cut-off at the top of the pipe, the
shipper. has completely lost control and the carrier, it would seem,
has accepted possession. At that moment then the bailment and
the carrier's liability begins.
It is not sufficient delivery to the carrier merely to place the
goods in a place where he may conveniently get them ;17 as at the
wharf from which he sails 18 or the inn from which his coach
starts,10 or the station from which his train starts.2 0
If however the carrier consents to receive goods when they
have been placed in a certain spot, he may become responsible
for goods as soon as they are placed there, without further act
of acceptance by any person acting for him. A common instance
of this sort is the posting of a letter in the box placed by the post-
office department to receive it. So where a railroad company
made an express agreement to accept cotton-seed when placed
beside its track at a point between stations, it was held that its
responsibility as carrier began as soon as the seed was deposited
in accordance with the agreement.21 The court in the course
of its opinion said: "Parties having freight to be transported
by rail cannot make a good delivery to the railroad company by
simply depositing the goods along the line anywhere and every-
where; but where by agreement freight is deposited at a given
point on the line of railway for the purpose of immediate, trans-
portation, there seems to be no good reason why such deposit
should not constitute delivery to the carrier, whose liability would
commence from the time the goods were deposited at the place
agreed on."
The consent of the carrier to receive goods when placed in
a certain place may be established by evidence of a special custom
to that effect. In such a case the extent of the carrier's respon-
sibility would be determined by the nature of the custom. If a
custom can be shown for the carrier to be in charge and under-
take responsibility for the goods from the moment of deposit,
then he will undergo the legal liability of carrier from the mo-
17. O'Bannon v. Southern Exfi. Co., 5z Ala. 481.
18. Buckman v. Levi. 3 Camp. 4r3.
ig. Selway v. Holloway, i Ld. Ray. 46.
20. Slim v. Great Northern Ry., 14 C. B. 647.
21. Georgia S. &- F. Ry. v. Marchman, 121 Ga. 235, 48 S. E. 96!.
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ment of deposit in accordance with the custom, even though he
has no notice of the deposit.22
This often happens in the case of a union station, where
goods arriving by one carrier are to be delivered by it to a sec-
ond carrier for further carriage. Under these circumstances it
is frequently the custom for the first carrier to deposit the goods
in a part of the station appropriated to the second carrier, and
for the latter then to be in charge of the goods without notice.
In such a case the liability of the second carrier begins at the
moment of deposit, even though the deposit is made at night or
some other time when the second carrier has in fact no servants
at hand to receive and care for the goods thus deposited.2 3 Where
such a custom is proved to place goods in a freight car on a
siding, the carrier is responsible as such from the moment the
car is loaded and ready for the carrier to take it,2' and if the cus-
tom is to take charge of goods deposited beside the track ready
for shipment, the carrier's responsibility begins from the moment
of such deposit.25
The custom established is however quite likely to be a custom
to take charge of goods left in a certain place only after notice
to the carrier that they are in the customary place ready for car-
riage. A custom thus limited must be followed exactly ac-
cording to its terms; and unless the custom goes so far as ex-
pressly to prove consent of the carrier to receive goods placed in
the place provided for them without notice to the carrier, a
deposit in the usual place without notice to the carrier will not
render him liable .2  Indeed it was asserted by the Supreme
Court of New York, that a delivery in accordance with any cus-
tom must always be accompanied by notice to some authorized
agent of the company.27  This opinion, as has been seen, goes
too far; but it is clear that a custom of the nature under consider-
ation usually requires notice to the carrier.
22. Montgomery &- E. Ry. v. Kolb, 73 Ala. 396; Merriam v. Hartford
&.N H. R. R., 2o Conn. 354; Evansville &- T. H. R. R. v. Keith, 8 Ind.
App. 57, 35 N. E. 296; Green v. Milwaukee &- S. P. R. R., 38 Ia. zoo;
Meyer v. Vicksburg S. &. P. R. R., 5 La. Ann. 639.
23. Converse v. Norwich &- A. Y. T. Co., 33 Conn. z66.
24. St. Louis, _.. M. &- S. Ry. v. Murhy, 6o Ark. 333, 30 S. W. 419;
Evansville & T. H. R. R. v. Keith, S Ind. App. 57, 35 N. E. 296.
25. Montgomery &- E. R. R. v. Kolb, 73 Ala. 396; Illinois C. R. R. v.
Smyser, 38 Ill. 354.
26. Trowbridre v. Cha;in, 23 Conn. 595; Wrig ht v. Caldwell, 3 Mich.
5j: Packardv. Getman, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 757; Ballv. New Jersey S. B. Co.,
4 Daly (N. Y.) 491.
27. Packard v. Getman, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 757.
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The carrier will however not be liable under the custom,
without express assent and assumption of actual possession, unless
the custom is strictly followed out by depositing the goods in the
customary and reasonable place. Thus where a cutter was placed
upon the platform of a freight station and the proper agent noti-
fied, but it was carelessly placed so that it projected over the tracks
and was struck and injured by a passing train, the court held
that "the delivery was not as perfect and complete as it should
have been," and that the carrier had never come into possession
of the cutter. "Suppose," the court continued, "the servant had
left the cutter on the track of the railroad, and notified the agent,
would the defendant have been responsible? Clearly not, for the
apparent reason that there was no delivery upon the premises, no
surrender of the property into the possession of the agent. Un-
til it was actually delivered, the agent was under no obligation
to take charge of the property, even if notified. It is apparent
that the plaintiff was in fault in not delivering the property to the
defendant, and in leaving it in an exposed condition, which caused
its destruction; and, having fdiled to establish this material part
of his case, should have been nonsuited." 28
While the decision in the case was doubtless influenced by
the fact that the plaintiff was negligent in leaving the cutter where
he did, and while it is not clear that a custom existed which would
make a deposit with notification effective, it is still clear that the
court held that a delivery by deposit and notification, to be effect-
ual, must be made in the exact customary spot; and that this must
be a place where the goods might be safely left until the time came
for the carrier to assume actual control. This view appears to
be entirely sound.
In the absence of the agreement or custom, placing goods in
the place where the carrier usually receives them does not Tender
the carrier liable as such. So, if in answer to a request of a ship-
per a carrier leaves a car on a track to be loaded by the shipper.
who places the goods in the car and leaves the car to be attached
by the carrier to the next train, the carrier is not responsible, in the
absence of a special custom to that effect, or special agreement
between the parties.2 9  So the deposit of goods beside a railroad
track, as upon a platform provided to receive them, though they
are so deposited for immediate shipment ready to be loaded upon
28. Grosvenor v. New York C. R. R., 39 N. Y. 34.
29. Tate v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 78 Mtiss. 842, 29 So. 392, 84 Am. St.
Rep., 649; Houston .. 7. C. Ry. v. Hodde, 42 Tex. 467; Yoakum v. Dryden(Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. 312.
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the freight train when it arrives, is not, in the absence of special
custom, enough to render the carrier liable.30
This principle was involved in a case of water carriage on the
Mississippi river. The carrier was engaged in the transportation
of wheat in bulk in barges, which are taken in tow by its steam-
boat. A barge was left at a certain wharf; the shipper (without
notice to the carrier) loaded the barge with wheat, filled out a
blank bill of lading, and handed the bill to a clerk of the carrier, who
however did not know that the barge had been loaded or that the
bill covered wheat in the barge. The barge sank before it was
acttially taken in tow by the defendant's steamboat; and the carrier
was held not to be responsible, in the absence of a custom "that
the barge when loaded, was considered in the custody of the
steamer without notice to any of her officers.3 1
In these cases there is some authority for holding that a de-
posit in the regular place for receiving goods followed by notice
to the carrier is enough to make the carrier responsible as such,
even without proof of a special custom to that effect.32 In one
case it was even said that in such a case the gopds were in posses-
sion of the carrier as warehouseman until notice, and thereafter
in his possession as carrier.33 This is an untenable contention
which, another court said, no one would make. 3 ' The true doc-
trine seems to be that niere notice could not in such
a case impose liability on the company; but that acquiescence
of an authorized servant of the company at the time of receiving
the notice would amount to an express acceptance of the goods.
Where the owner of the goods goes along with them and
exercises some degree of care and watchfulness over them, it
sometimes becomes a question whether the carrier is responsible.
In the leading case it appeared that the defendant was a common
lighterman, and that it was the usage of the plaintiff, the East
India Company, to send in the lighters by means of which their
vessels were loaded, an officer, called a guardian, who as soon
as the lighter was loaded put the company's lock on the hatches
and went with the goods to see them safely delivered at the ware-
30. Wilson vt. Atlanta &- C. Ry., 82 Ga. 388, 9 S. E. 1076; Wells v.
Wilmington & W. R. R., 6 Jones L. (N. C.) 47.
3. The Keokuk, 9 Wall. 517.
32. Illinois C. R. R. v. Smyser, 38 111:354; Rqgers v. Long Island R,
R., 2 Lans. (i. Y.) 269; contra, Anderson v'. Mobili & 0. R. R., 38 So. 66x.
(Miss. zgos).
33. Basnight vi. Atlantic &. AT. C. R. R., ixv N. C. 592, 16 S. E., 323
34- Yoakum v. Dryden (Tex. Civ. App'), 26 S. W. 312.
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house. This usage having been followed, part of the goods were
lost. Lord Raymond, Chief Justice, "was of opinion this differed
from the common case, this not being a trust in the defendant, and
the goods were not to be considered as ever having been in his
possession, but in the possession of the company's servant, who
had hired the lighter to use himself." The plaintiff was accord-
ingly nonsuited.35
If however the shipper merely goes with the goods and has an
eye on them for greater security, while the carrier has the pos-
session or general control, the carrier becomes responsible as such
upon assuming possession. Such is the case when a drover ac-
companies cattle to feed and water them. So where a servant
of the shipper went along with the carrier on account of the car-
rier being a stranger to the shipper, this was held not to negative
the carrier's responsibility; the case being distinguished from the
usage of the East India Company, "who never intrust the lighter-
man with their 'oods, but give the whole charge of the property
to one of their officers.1 3  Where the shipper himself furnished
the cars and brakemen, this was held not to affect the liability
of the carrier, the entire train while on the route being under
the control and management of the conductor and other servants
of the carrier.
3 7
In a case in the Supreme Court of the United States the car-
rier was engaged in transporting a body of soldiers and their bag-
gage. The soldiers packed their own baggage in a car selected
by themselves, and it was asserted that an armed guard accom-
panied the baggage."8 Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court
said: "If it were admitted that a special guard was appointed for
the car on the route, the admission would not aid the company or
relieve it of liability. The control and management of the car,
or of the train, 'by the servants and employees of the company
were not impeded or interfered with; and where no such interfer-
ence is attempted it can never be a ground for limiting the re-
sponsibility of the carrier that the owner of the property accom-
panies it and keeps a watchful lookout for its safety."
35. East India Co. v.. Pullen, x Stra. 690.
36. Robinson v. Dunmore, 2 B. & P. 4x6. This distinction is further
illustrated by Brindv. Dale, 8 C. & P. 207.
37. Mallory 7/. Tioga R. R., 39 Barb. 488. In the somewhat similar
case of Coup v. Wabash S. L. &- P. R. R., 56 Mich. ixi, the carrier was
held not liable as such; but that was on account of other special circum-
stances, not merely because the shipper's servants accompanied the goods.
38. Hannibal &- S. J. R. R. V. Swift, 12 Wall. 262.
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Where a passenger takes with him in the vehicle in which he
is carried small articles of personal baggage, it may be difficult
to determine how far the responsibility of the carrier extends to
them. It was clearly stated in an early English case that the
carrier would be responsible for it: "If a man travel in a stage-
coach and take his portmanteau with him, though he has his eye
upon the portmanteau, yet the carrier is not absolved from his re-
sponsibility but will be liable if the portmanteau be lost.' ' 3 0
This doctrine has been extended to the case of railway carriage.
If the railway porter takes luggage to carry for a passenger and
places it in the train or in a cab, and it is lost before it is rede-
livered to the passenger, the carrier is doubtless liable as stich ;40
the responsibility beginning when the luggage is delivered to the
porter. The language used in several cases goes further and ap-
pears to hold that where the luggage is placed by the porter in the
carriage with the passenger the carrier continues responsible as
such, being still in the possession of the luggage.4 1  That this
would be true if the luggage is placed in the carriage of the pas-
senger, not at the request of the latter, but for the carrier's con-
venience, is of course clear; and this would be even more obvious
if the passenger objected to such disposition of the luggage ;42
but the English courts go further: "It is the everyday practice
of passengers by railway to carry cloaks and such like articles
with them in the carriages, with the consent of the company, and
it cannot be said that the company have on that account parted
with their custody of them as carriers. ' ' 43  It is however clear that
the carrier is not under such circumstances an insurer and that the
amount of care required of it is materially lessened by the fact that
the passenger is in actual control.4 4
In this country (very likely because of a different usage as to
the matter, the railroad company here not taking charge of per-
sonal luggage, as a matter of course, by its porters or other ser-
vants) it has never been supposed that the railroad company as-
39. Chambre, J., in Robinson v. Dunmore, 2 B. & P. 46, 419.
40. Richardsv . London &- B. Ry., 7 C. B. 839, i8 L. J. (C. P.) 251;
Butcher v. London &, S. W. Ry., 16 C. B. 13, 24 L. J. (C. P.) 137; Le Con-
teur v. London &- S. W. Ry., 6 B. & S. 961; L. R. z Q. B. 54.
4r. Munster v. South Eastern Ry., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 676, 27 L. J. (C. P.)308: Le Conteur v1. London &- S. W, Ry., 6 . & S. 6i, L. R. i Q. B., r4 ;
Talley z,. Great Western Ry., L. R. 6 C. P., 44.
42. Munster v.South Eastern Ry., 4 (C. B. N. S.) 676, 27 L. J. (C. P.) 308.
43. Lush, J., in Le Conteur v. London &' S. W. Ry., sufira.
44. Talley v. Great Western Ry., L. R. 6 C. P. 44.
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sumed possession of personal luggage taken into its train by a
passenger; and it has therefore never been held liable for such
luggage as carrier.4
In the case of a ferry, the fact that the owner usually goes
along with the goods and often retains the entire charge and man-
agement of them (as for instance where he drives a horse on the
ferry boat and manages him while on the boat) materially modi-
fies the relation of carrier and shipper so that the carrier may not
be responsible for any injury caused by defect in placing or man-
aging the property; 46 but this does not affect the position of the
ferryman as carrier. While his liability is less in amount, it is
the same in kind as that of an ordinary carrier, and the time of
its beginning is settled upon the same principle.47
The carrier's liability begins at once on the receipt of goods
for transportation, 48 though the goods have not yet been placed
in the carrier's vehicle for transportation" and even though noL bill
of lading has been issued for them,50 and the freight has not been
prepaid.51
If however goods are received by the carrier, not for im-
mediate transportation, but to be held until further orders of the
shipper, the carrier holds the goods, pending such -orders, as a
warehouseman, not as a carrier.5 2  Thus where shipping direc-
tions are to be sent later, the carrier until such directions are re-
ceived, hold the goods as a warehouseman only;5 5 and so where
the goods are not to be sent until the shipper appears to go with
45. Tower v. Utica& S. R. R., 7 Hill, 47.
46. White v. Winnisimmet Co., 7 Cush. (Mass.) 155; Wyckoff v. Queens
County Ferry Co., 52 N. Y. 32; Wilsons v. Hamilton, 4 Ohio S. 722.
47. Wilsons v. Hamilton, 4 Ohio S. 722. Some of the language in White
v. Winnisimmet Co., and Wyckoffv. Q. C. F. Co., sufra, appears to deny
the liability as carrier; but the court was in reality passing only upon the
amount of liability.
48. Nichols v. Smith, irs Mass. 332; Rogers V. Wheeler, 52 N. Y. 262;
Clarke v1. Needles, 25 Pa. 338.
49. Grand Tower Co. 9. Ullman, 89 Ill. 244; Fitchburg &' W. R. R. Co.
v/. Hanna, 6 Gray (Mass.) 539; Mroses v. Boston &.' M. R. R., 24 N. H. 7,;
Blossom v. Griffn, 13 N. Y., 569.
50. Snow v. Caruth, i Sprague 324; Lakeman v. Grinnell, 5 Bosw. (N.
Y.) 625; East Line & R. R. Ry. v. Hall, 64 Tex. 6S.
53. Wood v. Devin, 13 Ill., 746; Evansville &- T. H. R. R. v. Keith, 8
Ind. App. 57, 35 N. E. 296.
52. White v1. Humiewry, ii Q. B., 43; Barron v. Eldridge. roo Mass.
455; Schmidt v. Chicago & N W. Ry., goWis. 5o4,63 N. W. x057.
53. St. Louis A. &- . H. R. R. v. Montgomery, 39 Ill. 335; Michigan
S. & N. LR. R. v. Shurtz, 7 Mich. 55; Sfiade v. Hudson R. R. R., 16
Barb. (N. Y.) 383.
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them.5 4 And so where a railroad had been seized by the govern-
ment for the transportation of troops, goods might be accepted
to be held until the government relinquished control of the rail-
road and then carried; and in that case the railroad would be
liable as warehouseman only until the government relinquished con-
trol. 5 5
Where the goods are to be transported at a certain time
named the carrier would hold them as a warehouseman until that
time, and as carrier at once as soon as the stated time arrived"
If the goods are detained before transportation, not by re-
quest of the shipper. but from his failure to furnish legible or ade-
quate shipping directions, the carrier, not being able to transport
at once, is responsible only as a warehouseman.-
The same thing is true if the goods are, by agreement, placed
in the carrier's care, but without liability as carrier on his part
until he chooses to begin transportation. 8  On this prin-
ciple it has been held that where cattle were by the per-
mission of a railroad company placed in its pens, by the
shipper's servants and remained in their charge, the carrier had not
become responsible i59 and the same decision was reached in a case
where the shipper retained the right to remove the cattle from the
pens to feed and water them. 0
If the carrier has not undertaken to transport immediately,
but is authorized to carry, if he chooses, or to wait until a later
time, it has been held in a Massachusetts case that the carrier is
liable only as warehouseman until he chooses to transport. The
plaintiff was shipping a lot of iooo corn-planters, of which 9oo
had already been delivered to the carrier. The carrier was author-
ized, but not required, to carry at once the part delivered to him.
The court held that the carrier was not liable as such for the part
delivered, which they were holding until the delivery of the rest.
"If the convenience of doing the business required the defendant
to carry the whole lot together instead of dividing the business into
54. Little Rock & F. S. Ry., v. Hunter, 42 Ark. 200.
55. Illinois C. R. R. v. Ashmead, 58 Il., 487; Illinois C. R. R. v. Horn-
berger, 77 Ill. 457.
56. Illinois C. R. R. v. Tronstine, 64 Miss. 834.
57. Finn v. Western R. R., 102 Mass. 283; O'Neill v. New York C. 6.
H. R. R. R.. 6o N. Y. 138.
s8. Otis Mfg. Co. v. The Ira B. Ellems, 50 Fed. 934; Fitchburg v. W.
R. R. v. Hanna, 6 Gray, 539 (semble).
59. Fort Worth &- D. C. Ry. v. Riley (Tex. App. r886) r S. W. 446.
6o. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Powers, 103 N. W. 678 (Neb. 19o5).
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different jobs, to be done at different times, and this was known
to the plaintiff, and he delivered the separate parcels at the depot
to be stored till the whole lot should arrive, the goods would be
stored in warehouse, although the plaintiff should have been will-
ing that they should be carried in many small parcels, and should
have given the defendants authority to carry them in that manner. '"61
It will be noticed that the opinion makes the position of the
carrier depend upon the shipper's knowledge of the carrier's inten-
tion; and that this might perhaps be taken to constitute a special
contract between the parties. But the correctness of this view
may be doubted. The liability of the carrier as such must, it would
seem, depend upon his possession, with the obligation to trans-
port, and the right (though not necessarily the obligation) to
transport immediately. Thus where goods are offered to a rail-
road company at an unreasonably long time before the train starts
-as where, for instance, baggage is offered in the evening for
carriage in a train the next morning-if the carrier takes the
goods he becomes responsible at once as a carrier, although the
shipper knows that according to the time-table the goods will
not be carried until a later time.6 2 And where a horse was de-
livered to a railway before the train was prepared, and was put
by the railway company into a horse-box and killed before it was
put on board the train, the railway was held liable.6
In a case which seems to be on all fours with the Massa-
chusetts case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reached an oppo-
site conclusion. The shipper gave a trunk to the railroad to carry
and on inquiry he said he did not care whether the trunk was
carried immediately or not, since he should not need it at its des-
tination until several days later, when he himself should arrive
there. The trunk was lost while waiting transportation; and the
carrier's liability as such was held to have attached.64
It sometimes happens that a parcel is given to the servant of
a carrier under such circumstances that it seems doubtful whether
the servant or the master becomes the bailee and carrier. It is
quite possible for the servant of a carrier to take and carry goods
independently of his master, and when this is alleged to be the case
all the circumstances must be examined to determine the question.
61. Chapman, J., in Watts v. Boston &- L. R. R., io6 Mass. 466.
62, Hickox v. Naugatuck R. R., 31 Conn., 28X; Camden &. A. R. R.
Belknap, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 354.
63. Mojffat v. Great W. Ry., 15 L. T. Rep. 630.
64. Shaw v. Northern Pac. R. A., 4o Minn. 144.
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If the shipper is aware that the carriage is a private matter, for
the private gain of the servant, he cannot hold the master liable;85
and so if he delivers to the servant to be carried gratuitously, as
a matter of friendship, since such an arrangement is not a busi-
ness arrangement and could hardly be supposed by the shipper
to be made on the master's account ;6 6 but the mere fact that by
an arrangement between the carrier and his servant the latter was
to receive the compensation would not absolve the carrier from
liability to the shipper.8 7 The question is often solved by deter-
mining whether the goods are of a sort which the carrier is ac-
customed to accept for carriage. Thus, dogs never having been
received as of right by a carrier on a passenger train, dogs
delivered to the baggage master are not in the hands of the rail-
road. 8 The question often comes up in the case of the carriage
of packages of money by the master or purser of a steamboat, or
by the driver of a stage. If the carrier has never undertaken to
carry money and the only usage (even though known to the car-
rier) is for the servant to take, the carrier is not responsible for
money taken by the servant;89 while if there is a general usage
to receive the money on behalf of the carrier, the latter will be-
responsible when it is taken by the servant.70
On this principle it was held that where a street-car com-
pany had become accustomed to receive parcels on the front plat-
form of its cars, it became responsible as a carrier of goods when
a parcel was so received by one of its drivers.71
Since a bailment is required before the carrier of goods
becomes responsible as such, it must be clear that without such
bailment one cannot be a carrier of goods. It sometimes happens
that a bill of lading is issued by the servant of a carrier without
a delivery to the carrier of the goods named in the bill. Such
issue of a bill of lading does not make the carrier responsible as
65. Butter v. Basing, 2 C. & P. 613.
66. Suarez v. The Washington, r Woods, 96; Mechanics &- T. Bank
v. Gordon, 5 La. Ann. 604; Choteau v. Steamboat St. Authony, 16 MO. 216.
67. Dwight v. Brewster, i Pick. (Mass.) 5o; Bean v. Sturtevant, 8 N.
H. 146; Mayall v. Boston &' M. R. R., 39 N. H. 122; Farmers' &- M. Bahk
v. Champlain T. Co., 23 Vt. x86.
68. Lee v. Burgess, 9 Bush (Ky.) 652; Honeyman v. Oregon &- C. R.
R., 13 Ore. 352.
69. Citizens' Bank '. Nantucket S. B. Co. 2 Story 16; Mechanics' St .
Bank v. Gordon, 5 La. Ann. 604; Choteau v. St. Anthony, r6 Mo. 216; Allen
v,. Sewell. 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 335.
70. Hosea McCrory, 12 Ala. 349.
71. Leviv. Lynn &'B. R. R., xr Allen (Mass.) 30o.
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a carrier for the goods described in the bill.7 2  In some juris-
dictions it has, to be sure, been held that if a bill of lading was
issued by the proper agent of the carrier and was indorsed for
value to a bona fide purchaser the carrier could not as against
him dispute the receipt of the goods; 78 and where a carrier is-
sued two bills of lading for the same goods, and the two bills
came into the hands of two holders for value and without notice,
it was held that the carrier could not dispute the receipt of two
lots of goods.7 4  But this is based on the doctrine of estoppel;
the carrier is not responsible as such on real facts, but in this par-
ticular case the real facts cannot be shown.
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